Abstract
Introduction
game dynamics (SGD) [Hashimoto, 2006] . However, these results are restricted to two-player games. When more players are involved, different dynamics emerge [Pacheco et al., 
71
To answer this question, we enhance the MGD to look at combinations of multiplayer 72 games, and provide an analytical framework for analyzing an ensemble of games in a tractable 73 manner. We present a complete and general method to study multiple games with many 74 strategies and players, all at once (Fig. 1) . When the games have more than two strategies, 75 we find that they cannot be separated back to their SGDs, in line with previous findings.
76
Interestingly, however, we find a dependency on the initial conditions (i.e., the initial fre-77 quencies of each strategy). For certain initial conditions, one may still be able to capture 78 the SGDs from their MGD.
79

Model and Results
80
Single game dynamics (SGD)
81
Two player games with two strategies have been studied extensively, both in infinite as well 
The two individuals are represented by a row and a column respectively and each can adopt 85 one of the two strategies 1 or 2. We write the elements of the matrix in the form a i,α ,
86
where i is the strategy of the focal player. The vector α is written as α = (α 1 , α 2 ) where 87 α 1 (number of individuals of strategy 1 in the column) and α 2 (number of individuals of 88 strategy 2 in the column), together represent the group composition. In a 3-player game with 89 two strategies, a payoff matrix entry, say a 2,(1,1) , where α 1 = 1 and α 2 = 1, will correspond 90 to a focal player with strategy 2 interacting with two other players with strategies 1 and 2, 91 respectively.
92
The average payoff obtained from the game is the reproductive success of that strat-93 egy [Maynard Smith, 1982] . This analysis has been extended to interactions having multiple 
Even while extending the number of strategies, the dynamics of this complicated system can still be analyzed by the replicator dynamics [Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998, Schuster and Sigmund, 1983] . For a d player game with m strategies, the replicator dynamics is given by a set of m differential equationsẋ
where x i is the frequency of strategy i, and f i is the fitness of the strategy i (see tary Information (SI) text). The average fitness of the population is given byf = m j=1 x j f j .
99
This simple evolutionary game framework has been used to describe a wide range of phe- 
110
Switching between such socially driven games is realistic and not only a matter of theoretical 111 interest but has been experimentally explored as well [Wedekind and Milinski, 1996] .
112
To contrast multi-game dynamics (MGD) with the previously discussed single game dy-113 namics (SGD), consider a simple example of two, 2 × 2 games:
Combining the strategies from the above two games results in four categories of individuals 115 (Fig. 2) . The frequencies of the four categories are given by x 11 , x 12 , x 21 and x 22 where the 116 first and second positions (in the subscript) denote the strategies adopted in games 1 and 117 2, respectively (Fig. 2) . For a combination of N games, in principle, each game j can be 118 described by a payoff matrix A j . Each game j could be a d j player game with m j number 119 of strategies. The categorical frequencies would then be given by x i 1 i 2 ...i j ...i N where i j is the 120 strategy being played in game j.
121
The frequencies of the individual strategies for all N games can be written down as,
Players G a m e s S t r a t e g i e s 2 Figure 1 : Scope of this study. Typical evolutionary game dynamics focuses on two player games with two strategies. Extensions to multiplayer games (d) and multiple strategies (m, solid blue rectangle) expands the domain of study to public goods games and other social dilemmas. However this is still limited to a single game. Hashimoto [2006] has extended two player-multi-strategy games in a novel direction of multiple games (N , dotted red rectangle). Our work generalizes this approach and develops a method for analyzing multiple games, where each involved game could be a multiplayer (and multi-strategy) game. Thus, this approach enables us to study the entire space of multiple games (N ) with multiple strategies (m) consisting of multiple players (d). Using this individual strategy frequency for a game j, the fitness of strategy i j is given by,
@ a
As before, α m j is the number of strategy m j players. Using multi-index notation, we have α = (α 1 , α 2 , ..., α m j ) which gives us the multinomial coefficient, with the absolute value |α| = α 1 + α 2 + ... + α m j and the power p α = p
. The average fitness of the population is given by, φ j = (pf) j (see SI text). Putting all this information together, we can write down the time evolution of all the categorical strategies as,
This system of equations is reminiscent of the replicator equation for the SGD. The summa-122 tion in the MGD replicator equations is due to an assumption of additive fitness effects from 123 all games [Hashimoto, 2006] . In the following sections we will explore the use of this formu- 
To illustrate games with two strategies, we shall use the payoff matrices shown in (7). Here,
146
A 1 is a two player coexistence game and A 2 is a three player game. In Game A 2 , the values 
151
Next, we shall look at an example where one game, say, A 1 , has three strategies. Let A 1 to be a Rock-Paper-Scissor type game as shown in the first payoff matrix in 8.
11 12 22 1 10 1 5.5 2 4 10 3
Since the determinant of the matrix is positive, the trajectories starting from any initial 152 condition will converge to a unique stable equilibrium. The other game, A 2 , as shown in (8) is a three player game similar to the one used before in (7). In the SGDs of these games, In the multi-game dynamics, p 11 (playing strategy 1 in game 1) converges to q 1 = 0.5 which is the equilibrium solution for strategy 1 in game 1. If we start above the unstable equilibrium solution for game 2 i.e q 2 2 = 0.2763932, then p 21 (playing strategy 1 in game 2) converges to q 2 1 = 0.7236068 which is the stable equilibrium solution for game 2. For trajectories that commence below the unstable equilibrium, strategy 1 goes to extinction. Clearly, p 12 = 1 − p 11 and p 22 = 1 − p 21 . The initials conditions for {x 11 , x 12 , x 21 and x 22 } used in these plots are : ic 1 = {0.2, 0.1, 0.2, 0.5}, ic 2 = {0.1, 0.1, 0.6, 0.2} and ic 3 = {0.1, 0.6, 0.1, 0.2}. A 2 is a 4-player three strategy game used previously in Gokhale and Traulsen [2010] 
167
For multiplayer games, we perform a similar study as in two player games. The MGDs can 168 be separated into SGDs if both the games have only two strategies (Fig. 3) . The expression 169 for W K though, would have higher order terms. Thus, the attractor may no longer be a line, 170 but instead a curve W K in a higher dimensional space. We performed an analysis where only 171 one game has two strategies (Fig. 4) and here too the MGDs can be separated into their 172 integral SGDs. However, while considering more than two strategies in both games (Fig. 5) , 173 the MGDs cannot always be trivially separated into their constituent SGDs. As in Hashimoto to the fixed point solutions of the SGDs, while many others do not. 
where π i is the average payoff of strategy i. We have extended this to multiple games. In 
The above expression is utilized to calculate the fitnesses of the categorical types
and F h 1 h 2 h 3 ...h N (see SI text) and using these expressions, the fixation probability of type We devised a method to combine the various multiplayer multi-strategy games that in-217 dividuals play at a certain period to incorporate the observed complexity while modelling 218 games that biological entities play; to advance further into creating more realistic models.
219
Taking more than two strategies into account represents situations such as the three strategy 
231
[2012], multiple games and multi-strategies can be seen as multiple loci with several alleles.
232
The case for two loci and two strategy games has been investigated by Cressman et al.
233
[2000] while the three strategy games by Hashimoto [2006] . Since we consider more than 234 two players, our work can be extended to investigate polyploidy as well [Han et al., 2012] .
235
In a nutshell, from the analyses that we performed, the outcomes from multiplayer two Even though complicated dynamics can still be captured by the relatively simple replicator 242 like equations, vast domains in the multiple games space remain unexplored.
243
APPENDIX
Games
Initial conditions rounded up to 10 decimal places Initial conditions rounded up to 100 decimal places (2 × 2) + (2 × 2) All trajectories converged All trajectories converged (3 × 3) + (3 × 3)
All trajectories converged 0.46% of total trajectories converged (2 × 2) + (2 × 2 × 2)
All trajectories converged All trajectories converged (3 × 3) + (2 × 2 × 2)
All trajectories converged All trajectories converged
No trajectory converged No trajectory converged 
In matrix 14, we write the elements in the form a i,α , where i is the strategy of the focal given by f 1 = a 1,(1,0) x 1 + a 1,(0,1) x 2 and f 2 = a 2,(1,0) x 1 + a 2,(0,1) x 2 . The replicator equation
255
Eq. (15) [Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998, Nowak, 2006] describes the change in frequency x i 256 of strategy i over time.
where f i is the fitness of strategy i and φ is the average fitness. For an infinitely large 258 population size we have x 1 = x, x 2 = 1 − x Thus the replicator equation for the change in 259 the frequency of stratey 1 is,
Apart from the trivial fixed points (x = 0 and x = 1), there is an internal equilibrium given 261 by,
Multiplayer games
263
We now extend the dynamics to multiplayer games [Gokhale and Traulsen, 2014] . The payoff 264 matrix (18), represents a three player (d = 3) two strategy (n = 2) game; a 2 × 2 × 2 game. 
The rows correspond to the focal player. Focal player interacting with two other players,
267
both with strategy 1 will receive a payoff a 1,(2,0) . While interacting with one strategy 1 268 player and another strategy 2 player, he will get a 1,(1,1) . Interacting with two other strategy 269 2 individuals, the payoff is equal to a 1,(0,2) . Assuming that the order of players does not 270 matter, the average payoffs (or in this case, the fitnesses) will be,
The replicator equation in this case is given by,
The quadratic x 2 term in Eq. (20) can give rise to a maximum of two interior fixed points. In is just a variable transformation that can be written as (here, i j ∈ {1, 2} and j ∈ {1, 2}),
The fitnesses for playing strategy i j in game j can be written out as, 
A crucial assumption here is that the effective average payoff is a linear composite of the 289 constituent games. The replicator dynamics will be given by the following set of coupled
The average fitness φ is given by,
294
In a population of size Z consisting of strategy 1 and 2 players, the probability that one of 295 the strategies, say 1, fixes, is given by the fixation probability ρ 1 . An individual is chosen 296 proportional to its fitness to reproduce an identical offspring. Another individual is chosen 297 randomly and discarded from the group. Therefore, the group size is kept at a constant value 298 Z. Fitness of a strategy s can be a linear function of its average payoff π s i.e f s = 1−w+wπ s .
299
In a population that has i strategy 1 players, the fitnesses can be used to calculate the 
With probability 1−T the fixation probability can be calculated [Nowak, 2006, Traulsen and Hauert, 2009 ] to be,
Since
selection. Therefore,
For a d-player game, the payoffs are obtained using a hypergeometric distribution given by,
Thus,
Maintaining weak selection, then from [Gokhale and Traulsen, 2010] we have, 
In contrast to the binomial distribution which is used for infinite populations where the 321 draws can be considered independent, the hypergeometric distribution was used for sampling Therefore, for finite populations, we shall use the multivariate hypergeometric distribution.
326
For a population of size Z containing γ 11 type A 1 1 A 2 1 and Z − γ 11 type A 1 1 A 2 2 individuals, 327 the average payoffs π ji j for playing strategy i j in game j (in our example, i j ∈ {1, 2} and 328 j ∈ {1, 2}) are
In general, for N multi-strategy d-player games,
We can calculate the fitnesses using linear or exponential mapping. If w j is the intensity 331 of selection in game j, then 332 f ji j = 1 − w j + w j p ji j for linear mapping e w j p ji j for exponential mapping.
Thus, in the combined dynamics, the fitness (assuming it to be additive) of type A 1
If we are looking at an edge with types A 1
, the tran-
to increase from γ to γ + 1 (and type
to be randomly selected for death) is
Likewise, T − γ will be
So, for a A 1
As where the fitness is obtained using a linear mapping. In order to further simplify the model, 343 we consider that all games have the same selection intensity. In this case,
It is worth mentioning here that the assumption of having equal intensities for all games is 345 strong. Many times, the selection on one game may be more intense than others. These .
While looking at an edge for which, say, game 2 in both vertices has the same strategy and 354 thus, we need to only look at differences in one game i.e. only game 1 matters (π 2i 2 = π 2h 2 ), 
Result II
357
If all games have the same intensity, we could also add the payoffs first and then perform the of games is not trivial as bringing all the smaller games into one larger game but we cannot 364 always disintegrate the multi-game back to all the inherent single games.
365
The fixation probability Eq. (38), in this case will be, .
Here, if we look at an edge for which, say, game 2 in both vertices has the same strategy .
This corresponds to equation Eq. (27) for a single game with two strategies i 1 and h 1 .
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